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The Directive 2014/94/UE (DAFI, Alternative Fuel Initiative Directive) on the deployment of alternative fuels 
(i.e. hydrogen) infrastructures has been recently transposed into national law in Italy. Consequently, the 
technical regulation on fire prevention for H2 fuelling stations has been updated, in order to consider the 
current maximum delivery pressure (700 bar) of gaseous hydrogen for road vehicles. This technical regulation 
establishes the prescriptive safety distance from a piece of equipment. In the case of a new station, an 
assessment of the frequency of the event and its potential consequences is necessary. This is to understand 
which risk can reasonably be mitigated by a safety distance or whether additional mitigation or prevention 
measures should be taken. This paper presents the quantitative risk assessment (QRA) study on a hydrogen 
station planned to be installed, study which aims at determining the safety distances. Such study utilizes the 
Sandia-developed QRA tool, Hydrogen Risk Analysis Model (HyRAM), to calculate risk values when 
developing risk-equivalent plans. HyRAM combines reduced order deterministic models that characterize 
hydrogen release and flame behavior with probabilistic risk models to quantify risk values. Thanks to HyRAM 
tool it is possible to estimate physical effects and consequences on people and structures and plants, related 
to risk scenarios, by means of a damage model library. Use of risk assessment may allow station owners and 
designers to flexibly define station-specific mitigations, with the purpose of achieving equal or better levels of 
safety with respect to prescriptive recommendation levels, as suggested by ISO19880-1 (2018).  
1. Introduction
Hydrogen-powered motor vehicles have at present very low market penetration rates. For this reason a build-
up of a sufficient hydrogen refuelling infrastructure is essential to make larger-scale deployment of hydrogen-
powered motor vehicle possible. The Directive 2014/94/EU (DAFI, Alternative Fuel Initiative Directive), 
transposed into law in Italy with the Legislative Decree 257 on December 16, 2016, establishes a common 
framework of measures for the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructures in the European Union in order 
to minimize dependence on oil and to mitigate the environmental impact of transport. This Directive sets out 
minimum requirements for the building-up of an alternative fuels infrastructure, including refuelling points for 
hydrogen, to be implemented by means of Member States' national policy frameworks. In Italy, the technical 
regulation on fire prevention for H2 refuelling station (DM August 31, 2006) establishes a maximum pressure 
of 350 bar of gaseous hydrogen, which is not consistent with the delivery pressure of new-generation 
hydrogen vehicles (up to 700 bar), which is needed to ensure greater quantity of stored gaseous hydrogen 
and less refill time. The authors worked together to break down this obsolescence constraint by revisiting and 
modifying the current technical regulation to guarantee adequate pressure to the new technological standards.  
In this general framework there is a fundamental issue concerning the safety of people, which is generally 
accomplished by specifying prescriptive separation distances. A safety distance is defined as the minimum 
separation between a hazard source and an object (human, equipment or environment) that mitigates the 
effect of a likely foreseeable incident and prevents a minor incident from escalating to a larger one 
(HyApproval, 2008; EIGA, 2007). Among the various methods and tools for determining safety distances, the 
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risk-informed method combines elements from a quantitative risk analysis and data obtained from a 
deterministic approach. The general QRA framework for hydrogen uses a combination of probabilistic and 
physical models, with the aim of assessing the likelihood and impacts of various hydrogen release and ignition 
scenarios, which can lead to thermal and overpressure hazards. The primary scenario develops from the 
release and subsequent ignition of hydrogen. The two main hazards are: exposure to thermal effects from jet 
fires and deflagrations; and exposure to overpressures from deflagrations and detonations. Both of these 
hazards can affect people, property, structures, and the environment directly or indirectly. Several models with 
data linkages are typically needed to characterize the physical effects of the hazards. Information from the 
physical effect models is then passed into probit functions used to calculate consequences in terms of harm or 
loss.QRA allows to identify and quantify the various scenarios for an uncontrolled release of hydrogen and 
then to establish the contribution of these scenarios to the risk, taking also into account application of 
prevention and mitigation measures. For the assessment of the safety distances, the risk-informed method 
then imposes the selection of a risk level. While general QRA methods are applicable to hydrogen systems in 
industrial plant, more widespread use of QRA for refuelling stations was previously limited due to gaps in 
available data and models relevant to these hydrogen applications. However, research progress in models, 
data and tools is actively addressing many of these gaps. This paper describes an application of the QRA 
method to a hydrogen station planned to be installed. Hydrogen Risk Analysis Model software was the 
analysis. It provides a standard methodology for quantitative risk analysis by assessing safety within a 
hydrogen supply and storage infrastructure. In this analysis higher gas storage and delivery pressures than 
those defined by the technical regulation (DM August 31, 2006) were considered for the hydrogen refuelling 
station, along with the assesmnet of the required separation distances.  
2. Software HyRAM
The analysis was carried out using HyRAM software, developed by SNL (Sandia National Laboratories) for the 
FCTO (Fuel Cell Technologies Office) of DOE (U.S. Department of Energy). HyRAM employes both 
probabilistic and deterministic models for the identification and quantification of incidental scenarios. It also 
allows to predict the physical effects associated with them and the consequences that such incidents could 
generate both on people and on structures, through the use of various damage models (Groth et al., 2016). 
HyRAM uses various calculation models (Groth et al., 2015) to describe the behavior of hydrogen 
(thermodynamic state equation), the consequences of the release of hydrogen, the concentration profile of a 
jet (without ignition), the temperature profile, lenght and the heat flow generated by a jet fire, risk assessment 
and management. In particular, the flame and trajectory results are based on the Notional Nozzle Model 
developed by Birch et al. (1987). Assuming flow adiabatic reversible (isoentropic) from the equations of 
conservation of mass and momentum Birch et al. (1984) obtained the actual diameter of the jet after 
expansion is given by: 
	݀௘௙௙ 	= ݀ଶටఘమ௨మ஼ವఘయ௨య (1)
where d is the diameter, ρ the density and u the velocity of the gas while the subscript 2 indicates the jet outlet 
conditions and 3 the exit conditions after expansion through the notional nozzle. Birch models consider the 
temperature after expansion equal to the storage temperature, and the speed after expansion sonic. A 
successive development (Birch et al., 1987) of this model considered that the jet speed is calculated by 
equation: 
ݑଷ = ݑଶܥ஽ 	−	 (௉య	ି	௉మ)ఘమ௨మ஼ವ (2)
In HyRAM, the radial heat flux (in both directions perpendicular and parallel to the flame axis) is calculated 
through the Houf and Schefer (2007) flame radiation model, while to take account the buoyancy effects 
multiple source model is used (Hankinson and Lowersmith, 2012). This model considers that the total heat flux 
is given by point sources located on the flame axis, as follows:  
ݍ = ߬ܵ௥௔ௗ ௏ಷ஺೑ (3) 
where τ is the atmospheric transmissivity, Srad is the total emitted radiative power, VF is the view factor and Af 
is the flame area.Once the heat flux is calculated in relation to the position and type of target, the damage is 
assessed. The damage assessment is done through the Probit function (Y), enable to estimate the number of 
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expected deaths according to the thermal flow and the exposure time. Among Probit models included in 
HyRAM, Tsao and Perry (1979) model was used:  
Y	 = 	−36.38	 ൅ 	2.56	 ൈ 	ln	(V)   (4) 
 
where V is the thermal dose unit which combines the heat flux intensity and exposure time:  
 
ܸ = ܫସ/ଷ	ݐ   (5) 
3. Case study 
The case study analysed refers to a pilot plant, planned to be installed, for the distribution of hydrogen for fuel 
cell vehicles. A refueling station 50m x 20 m has been hypothesized, operating 300 days per year, and where 
50 vehicles per day are refuelled once a day, for a total of 15000 refuels per year. The plant is constituted by a 
compression, a storage and a distribution unit as showed in Figure 1. A multistage compressor is used and 
located in an outdoor area. Cylinder racks located outdoors are adopted as storage system. The geometrical 
characteristics and the operating conditions of the units are reported in Table 1. 
 
Figure 1: Layout of hydrogen refueling station  
Table 1: Geometric characteristics and operating conditions of dispenser, compressor and storage units 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Release frequencies and scenarios 
Events considered were identified by a HazOP analysis. These events are related to the release of gaseous 
hydrogen (GH2) from the dispenser area, compressor and high pressure storage unit. The possible scenarios 
that could occur after a hydrogen release are: unignited release, jet fire, explosion. The frequency of a 
scenario is determined once the frequency of the initiating event, which is the release of gaseous hydrogen, is 
evaluated. HyRAM contains default data for leak frequencies for hydrogen components. The probabilities were 
developed from a Bayesian process using generic leak probabilities and available hydrogen data (LaChance 
et al., 2009). Leak frequencies of the hydrogen components are expressed as a function of leak size which is 
defined as percentage of pipe diameter (0.01%, 0.1%, 1%, 10%, 100%). The frequency of scenarios was 
estimated through the event tree analysis (Norani et al., 2017). The most severe accident scenarios following 
release of GH2 are the jet fire (immediate ignition) and explosion (delayed ignition). According to HYSAFE 
program (Rodsaetre and Holmefjord, 2007) and Tchouvelev et al. (2006) the ignition probabilities are 
considered as a function of the GH2 release rate (Table 2). For the fire scenario only a single fire source is 
assumed, multiple fire events are not considered, as well as multiple release scenarios and combination of 
multiple vents (domino effects) are not considered.  
 Dispenser Compressor  Storage 
Valves 7 11 9.52 mm 
Instruments 4 6 9.52 mm 
Joints 45 45 9.52 mm 
Filters 2 2 9.52 mm 
Hoses 4  9.52 mm 
Compressors  1  
Pipe diameter (mm) 9.52 9.52 9.52 
Pipe length (m) 20 20 10 
H2 Temperature (°C) 15 15 15 
H2 Pressure (bar) 350 600 480 
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Table 2: Default ignition probabilities in HyRAM 
Hydrogen release rate (kg/s) Immediate ignition probability Delayed ignition probability 
<0.125 0.008 0.004 
0.125-6.25 0.063 0.027 
>6.25 0.23 0.12 
3.2 AIR - Average Individual Risk  
The risk for each scenario is obtained by the product of the frequency (fi) of that scenario and the 
consequences (ci) (in terms of fatality) caused by that scenario. HyRAM calculates the frequency of each 
scenario for each of the five leak sizes (0.01%, 0.1%, 1%, 10%, 100% of the pipe diameter) as the product of 
the frequency of a leak and the probabilities of each of the events leading to each end state. Then HyRAM 
samples a position for each exposed person and calculates the probability of fatality from the physical 
consequence at each position by using the probit models. The total number of fatalities is the sum of the 
product of the fatality probabilities and the number of exposed persons. The total fatality risk from the station 
PLL (Potential Loss of Life) is then calculated as the sum of the risk over all scenarios:  
 
ܲܮܮ = ∑ ௜݂ܿ௜௜    (6) 
 
The AIR (Average Individual Risk), which is the number of fatalities per exposed individual, is calculated by 
dividing the total fatality risk from the station (PLL) by the total exposed population. In the following it was 
considered that the station has one attendant on site at a given time. From AIR calculation it is obtained a 
measure of the risk from the station to each individual. 
For the evaluation of safety distances through the risk-informed method, it is necessary to choose a risk level. 
It was assumed an individual risk of 1x10-5  fatalities per year, value lower (about 1/3) than that the one 
adopted by EIGA (2007). 
3.3 Input parameters of risk analysis 
For the case study analysed, only jet fire scenarios were considered, because compressor is located outdoor 
and because an explosion scenario is not credible for the storage unit since the presence of pressure relief 
devices and leak-before-burst design specification of the sysytem. Furthermore, the presence of barriers 
between the hazard source and the target was not considered, while it is assumed the presence of a safety 
system that detect GH2 release and shut down the valves.  
The target (the attendant of the station) was assumed to be positioned along the axis of the jet. Exposure 
times were assumed equal to 5 and 60 s for the dispenser, while 5 and 30 s for the compressor and storage 
unit. These times refer to the times of intervention of the safety systems, according to the Hyapproval project 
(Wurster, 2006). The input parameters for the analysis are reported in Table 3. 
Table 3: Input parameters of risk analysis 
Case Unit Pressure (bar) Diameter (mm) Probability leak detection  Exposure Time (s) 
1 
 
Dispenser 350 9.52 90% 60 
2 Dispenser 350 9.52 90% 5 
3 Dispenser 350 9.52 10% 60 
4 Dispenser 350 9.52 10% 5 
5 Compressor 600 9.52 90% 60 
6 Compressor 600 9.52 90% 30 
7 Compressor 600 9.52 10% 60 
8 Compressor 600 9.52 10% 30 
9 Storage 480 9.52 90% 60 
10 Storage 480 9.52 90% 30 
11 Storage 480 9.52 10% 60 
12 Storage 480 9.52 10% 30 
4. Results and discussion 
This section presents results of calculation of safety distances for dispenser, compressor and storage units. 
An iterative procedure was performed until the target at a certain distance results to have an AIR value equals 
to 1x10-5 fatalities y-1. For the dispenser, the results show that the most severe scenario, corresponding to a 
leak size equal to 100% of pipe diamter, has a higher frequency than those related to other leak size; this is 
due to the higher probability of ignition, which is a function of the release rate, although the lower leak 
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frequency of the system components for 100% leak size scenario. Results for dispenser (case 1, 2, 3, 4) in 
terms of the AIR as a function of the distance are reported in Figure 2a, while those for compressor unit are 
reported in Figure 2b. For storage unit, the AIR calculated for case 9 and 10 is always less than 1 x 10-5 
fatalities y-1, because the frequency of scenarios is very low. The results in terms of safety distances are 
reported in Table 4. 
 
 
a) b) 
Figure 2: Comparison of the results for dispenser (a) and compressor (b) 
Table 4: Safety distances for hazard units of refuelling station  
Dispenser Safety distance (m) Compressor Safety distance (m) Storage unit Safety distance (m)
Case 1 21.8 Case 5 27.5 Case 9 - 
Case 2 17 Case 6 22.5 Case 10 - 
Case 3 24 Case 7 30 Case 11 7 
Case 4 18.6 Case 8 28.5 Case 12 6 
 
From Table 4 it can be observed that for the dispenser and the compressor the safety distances are reduced 
to 17 and 22.5 m (case 2 and case 6, respectively) when safety systems are affective and are activated in 
short time (shorter exposure time). These conditions can be achieved for the dispenser if it operates in 
conjunction with an emergency shutdown function, which may be automatically activated by the dispenser 
control system or manually activated. Activation of the emergency shutdown function shall cut off the flow of 
hydrogen gas to the dispenser and vehicle which initiated the shutdown by closing the automatic isolation 
valves. In the case of compressor both inlet and outlet pressure should be monitored by a pressure 
indicator/switch, with the control system instigating a shutdown of compressor. In the case of high pressure 
storage unit the safety systems assures values of AIR below the 1 x 10-5 fatalities y-1. 
Table 5: Comparison of safety distances for dispenser, compressor and storage unit at different pressures 
 DISPENSER  COMPRESSOR  STORAGE UNIT  
Diameter (mm) Safety distance (m) 
 
Safety distance (m) 
 
Safety distance(m) 
 
Pressure 350 bar 700 bar 600 bar 800 bar 480 bar 800 bar 
6 9 12.5 14.1 15.8 - - 
9.52 17 23.8 22.5 27 - - 
11 21.4 28.5 32.1 38.2 - - 
 
In Table 5 are reported the safety distances evaluated at various pressures and pipe diameters. They refer to 
the case of 90% leak detection and exposure time of 5 s for dispenser and 30 s for compressor and storage 
unit. As expected, an increase of the operative pressure of the refuelling station, as required by the higher 
delivery pressure for the new-generation hydrogen vehicles, determines higher safety distances. At the 
dispenser an increase in delivery pressure from 350 to 700 bar corresponds to an increase of safety distance 
from 17 to 23.8 m (about 1.4 times). Correspondingly, the lower diameter pipe (6 mm vs 9.52 mm) can 
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decrease the safety distance at values lower than 15 m. This value corresponds to the prescriptive distance 
established in the new-version of the Italian technical regulation on fire prevention for H2 refuelling station. In 
the case of compressor a fire barrier may be used as a mitigation option to reduce safety distances. If a fire 
barrier is used as a mitigation option, it shall be made of non-combustible materials. 
5. Conclusions 
One major aim of risk assessment is to provide a description of the hazard scenarios, their causes and 
consequences and uncertainties, for use in decision making. This information can be used to make changes 
to the design and siting of a hydrogen refuelling station with the aim to reduce the risk posed to people, 
surrounding plants/buildings and the environment. This paper presents the quantitative risk assessment study 
on a hydrogen station planned to be installed in Italy. The safety distances were determined and the protection 
and mitigation measures to reduce the safety distances were identified. 
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